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We are in receipt of the text of the opinion handed down on January 6,
1899, by the Supreme Court of the Hawaiian Islands, in reference to the peti-
tion of Wong Tuk and certain other Chinese for a writ of habeas cort us.
Petitioners were holders of bonafide permits issued to them by the Hawaiian
Government before the signing, on the 7tb day of July, z898, of the Joint
Resolution of Annexation, by President McKinley; some of them, indeed, had
resided in the Islands previously, and had left with the intention of returning.
On their arrival at Hawaii from China early in December they were arrested
by the Collector-General of Customs, who made return to the writ, that he
and the United States Chinese Inspector had examined them and ascertained
that none of them had complied with the requirements of the United States
statutes respecting the exclusion of Chinese. The Newlands Resolution of
Annexation provides, among other things: "There shall be no further immi-
gration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as
are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no
Chinese, by reason of anything therein contained, shall be allowed to enter
the United States from the Hawaiian Islands." Another clause provided that,
"Until Congress shall provide for the government of such Islands, all the civil,
judicial and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing govern.
ment in said Islands shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the
United States shall direct; and the President shall have power to remove said
officers and fill the vacancies so occasioned." Accordingly the President, by
proclamation made on August 12, 1898, continued the existing officers of the
Hawaiian Government in office. The Resolution further provided: "The
municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfilment
of the treaties so extinguished shall remain in force until the Congress of the
United States shall otherwise determine, excepting such legislation as is incon-
sistent with this Joint Resolution." Upon a petition of the same general
nature, Chief Justice Judd had shortly before decided that although the clause
of the resolution forbidding further Chinese immigration had virtually repealed
the Hawaiian statutes, which allowed a restricted immigration, yet under the
circumstances of the case, he was of the opinion that Congress had not
intended the clause to have a retrospective effect and render invalid these
permits. See, especially, Chew Yeong v. U. S., 112 U. S., p. 536. He was
strengthened in this opinion by the fact that the'United States statutes respect-
ing Chinese immigration are not self-executory and are not capable of being
enforced where there are no legally authorized officials to enforce them. In the
present case the chief justice adheres to this view, while his two associates on the
bench disagree with him upon these points, and further deny that the Hawaiian
court has any jurisdiction in the premises. The question, they say, is one
purely federal, arising under the laws and treaties of the United States, and
can tlheretore be taken cognizance of only by a federal court, established by
Congress under Art. III of the Constitution. To sustain this deduction, they
quote at length from the decision of Ableman v. Booth/ and U. S v. Booth. 21
How. 5o6. But it is difficult to discover in what way that decision is in point.
if at all analogous, since in those cases the courts of a regularly established
state asserted a paramount jurisdiction to those of the United States court,
upon a question undoubtedly federal. Indeed, it would seem to be a much
fairer inference, deducible from the words themselves of the Resolution and
the consequent proclamation of the President, that it was the intention of Con-
gress to erect the courts of the Islands into a sort of territorial court, until
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further action by Congress. thus preventing a manifest failure of justice in
many cases during the "'interregnum." Such an interpretation of the Resolu-
tion would give the court jurisdiction of some federal questions, at least, if
not of all that might be likely to arise. See Endleman v. U. S., 86 Fed. 456,
458, The Gra,eswt, 9 Wall. 129. McAllister v. U. S., 14i U. S. 174, and
cases there cited, particularly Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235, 242, 243. We
understand that the court, in an earlier case, assumed that it had jurisdiction
in admiralty, notwithstanding the Resolution. But there is nothing in the
present decision to lead one to infer that the court had in mind the distinction
suggested by Chief Justice Marshall, that while admiralty cases and cases
arising under the laws and treaties of the United States were both federal in
nature and both within the purview of Art. III of the Constitution, yet ad-
miralty cases were by no means cases arising under the laws and treaties of
the United States. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, z Pet. 544.
A case involving a novel state of facts upon the question of suits by third
parties to a contract who are not privy to the consideration has recently been
passed upon by the Court of Appeals of New York. The defendant in the
case, in order to contest a clause in the will of his uncle, Samuel J. Tilden,
and to procure funds for that purpose, promised one Robert D. Buchanan that
if he would procure him the necessary funds, he (defendant), in case of suc-
cess in the suit, would become responsible for the payment to Mrs. Buchanan
of the sum of $5o,ooo. Mrs. Buchanan was the adopted daughter of the tes-
tator, and not entitled by law to share in the distribution of the fund that
would become intestate estate if the present defendant should succeed in hav-
ing the particular clause declared invalid. Buchanan furnished the money,
and defendant, successful in the suit, paid Mrs. Buchanan $8,15o, but no
more. In an action by her to recover the balance of the $5o,ooo, the Court of
Appeals held, in affirmance of the trial court, and in reversal of the Supreme
Court, that she could recover in her own name. The relation of plaintiff to
testator gave her an equitable and moral, though not strictly legal. right
to share in "this scheme to attack the will," and share in the distribution.
Moreover, it was the bounden duty of her husband, if opportunity offered, to
provide for his wife against the day when he became incapacitated by disease
or death to do so. The court considered these as controlling features in the
case, and that it was, therefore, against the evidence to say that the agree-
ment was not a contract for the wife's support, such as she could herself sue
upon. Examined in the light of precedent, moreover, plaintiff has an
undoubted right to sue, and this not alone upon the broad principle laid down
in Lawrence v. Fox, 2o N. Y. 268, to the effect that an action will lie in a
promise by defendant, upon valid consideration, in favor of a plaintiff, not
privy to the consideration; but upon the ground of the decision in Dalton v.
Poole, i Ventris 318-332, decided in England in the reign of Charles II. That
was a case where the promise was made to a father to pay his daughter
.1i.ooo, on consideration that he would forbear to cut timber on land descenda-
ble to defendant, in order to raise a portion for the daughter. It was held,
that the daughter could maintain suit on the promise. This decision was
attacked by Lord Blackburn in Twaddle v. Aikins, 1o Eng. C. L. R. 393,
but has never been overruled, and is still good law, it seems, even in-England,
where the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, supra, is not accepted. -We can see,"
say the court, "no valid distinction between the relation of parent and child
and husband and wife as affording an ample consideration for covenants enur-
ing to the benefit of the child of wife." Justice Gray dissenting (Parker. Ch.
and O'Brien, J., concurring), thinks the rule of Zurnherr v. Ran, 135 N.
219 . applies, that the promisee must have a legal interest that the covenant
be performed in favor of a third party claiming performance; and that the
mere duty of a husband to provide for his wife did not furnish such legal
interest. But it is to be noticed that the majority of the court profess to decide
this case on its peculiar facts; and renders no opinion as to whether the mere
relation of husband and wife constitutes a consideration sufficient to enable
the plaintiff to maintain an action on the covenant.
